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*French Foreign Policy from Fashoda to Serajevo (1898-1914).* By GRAHAM H. STUART, Ph.D. (New York: Century Company. 1921. Pp. xii, 392. \$3.00.)

A SKETCH of the diplomatic position of France in the Europe of 1898 is the background against which Dr. Stuart outlines the development of French policy at Fashoda, at the first Hague Conference, and during the Boer War. His third chapter reviews French interests (1898-1905) in Turkey, Crete, and Siam, and in the Boxer uprising in China; his fourth treats of relations with Italy and the Vatican. Under the heading *Entente Cordiale* he traces at some length the growth of Anglo-French accord through the problems of the Bagdad railway, African difficulties, and the Russo-Japanese war. Six chapters on the Moroccan question—European rivalries, the fall of Delcassé, Algerias, Franco-German rivalry, 1907-1909, the Failure of the 1909 Settlement, and Agadir—form the heart of the book and contain, perhaps, its most important contribution. The final chapter leads Towards the World War. Although the heading does not necessarily imply a comprehensive treatment, many important developments from 1911 to 1914 are omitted; there is no discussion, for example, of French policy with reference to Belgium or the question of neutrality; no adequate attention is given to the Anglo-French naval understanding or to the Caillaux case and its international background. With respect to the rest of the book this chapter is foreshortened and the termination is distinctly weak. No attempt is made to carry the story beyond Serajevo.

Morocco is rightly emphasized as a very significant feature of French foreign policy, 1904-1914, but it would seem that the book as a whole has been worked up as a setting for a study of this subject, rather than to give a thorough, well proportioned presentation of the course of French diplomacy within the limits set. Certainly, important aspects have been overlooked or sacrificed to make way for the Moroccan problem. Relations with Russia throughout the period 1904-1914, the Bosnian crisis, the Tripolitan affair and, in general, Mediterranean interests have not been given sufficient emphasis. Problems such as the attitude of France during the Spanish-American War and the real inwardness of the French position during the Boer War have not really been attacked.

In form, Dr. Stuart's presentation is clear and readable; in content, it is on the whole an admirable recasting and elaboration of many of those expositions which were so hastily prepared, during the early days of the war, for the enlightenment of the American public. As a manual for the general reader and the college student it will be a convenient synthesis. And yet its extensive documentation argues, possibly, a more ambitious intent. For a well-rounded piece of scholarship the book is obviously too big in scope and too small in compass. The French point of view is over-developed in proportion to the attention

given to other angles of consideration. Although the author is generally moderate in his conclusions and treatment, his sympathies are apparent; he has drawn his material too exclusively from French sources. An extensive acquaintance with French official documents is demonstrated but there are no signs that many excellent secondary books have been exploited—particularly German books. The recent books of Eckardstein, Schwertfeger, Hammann and Friedjung have much of general importance to contribute to a study of this kind. It is strange that no reference is made, in presenting the Moroccan question, to the work of Closs, Zimmermann, Diercks, or Wirth, not to mention the books of the Frenchmen, Bernard and Gourdin.

A bibliography of eight pages, although not announced as comprehensive, ought, in a book of this character, to contain some critique, and it should not omit so many obvious titles; at least all books cited in the text should be included. Cases in point are Jaray, *La Politique Franco-Anglaise*, cited p. 109, note 23, and Millet, *Notre Politique Extérieure*, cited p. 121, note 49. There are many similar omissions in the index.

LAURENCE BRADFORD PACKARD.

*My Memoirs.* By Prince LUDWIG WINDISCHGRAETZ. Translated by Constance Vesey. (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1921. Pp. 356. \$5.00.)

FROM three of the most important statesmen in Austria-Hungary during the war we now have valuable personal narratives written in the time of their downfall or exile—Czernin, Andrassy, and Windischgraetz. From a fourth, greater than any of this trio, we shall probably have nothing, for Stephan Tisza was assassinated on the flagstones of his own baronial hall at the very close of the war, just as the rotten fabric of the Hapsburg monarchy was falling to pieces. Czernin's *In the World War* is valuable for its inside information on the Brest-Litovsk and other diplomatic negotiations which he conducted as foreign minister until his fall in 1917; but as an apologia it is hardly convincing. Julius Andrassy's *Diplomatie und Weltkrieg* analyzes with clear penetration, almost with philosophic calm, the complex internal conditions in the Dual Monarchy into which he had been initiated by his more famous father; with his clear grasp of the situation it was probably unfortunate that he lacked that political ambition and passion for action, of which most of his fellow-Magyar aristocrats had an excess, and so did not finally become foreign minister until October 25, 1918—when it was too late to salvage any of the wreckage. Of these three volumes of memoirs, the most valuable to the historian is unquestionably that of Prince Windischgraetz, because of its greater length, its vividness, and the diary-like detailed accounts of the telephone messages, secret meetings, and journeys of its tireless author.